Pilot Error Blamed for Flight 587 Crash=20
=20
By LESLIE MILLER, Associated Press Writer=20
WASHINGTON - The co-pilot of American Airlines Flight 587 caused the
November 2001 crash that claimed the lives of 265 people, the staff of the=

nation's airline safety agency reported Tuesday. The safety board itself
was expected to rule later Tuesday on the staff's findings.=20
Investigator Robert Benzon of the National Transportation Safety Board
(news - web sites) staff said the copilot's response to turbulence, just
seconds after the Airbus A300-600 plane took off from New York's John F.
Kennedy International Airport, was "unnecessary and aggressive."=20
Benzon also said that investigators found that American Airlines
improperly trained its pilots to use the aircraft's rudder while
recovering from upsets and said the problem could have been exacerbated by=

the airline's simulator training.=20
Benzon also said that the rudder control system on the aircraft is
sensitive at higher air speeds, which is potentially hazardous.=20
On Nov. 12, 2001, First Officer Sten Molin, the co-pilot, moved the
plane's rudder back and forth after takeoff, trying to control the
climbing aircraft, not realizing he was sealing the grim fate of those on
board.=20
Molin was at the controls when the plane hit turbulence almost immediately=

after taking off for the Dominican Republic.=20
"Hang onto it, hang onto it," Capt. Edward States implored.=20
"Let's go for power, please," Molin said.=20
A second later came a loud bang, which investigators believe was the tail
breaking off. Then came the roar of air rushing against the aircraft and
alarms sounding in the cockpit.=20
"What the hell are we into (inaudible)?" Molin said. "We're stuck in it."=20
States' last recorded words came five seconds later: "Get out of it! Get
out of it!"=20
Both Airbus Industrie, which manufactured the jetliner, and American
Airlines, which trained Molin, agree that if he had taken his foot off the=

rudder pedal, the tail wouldn't have broken off, the plane wouldn't have
plunged into a New York City neighborhood. It was the second deadliest
plane crash on U.S. soil.=20
But Molin didn't know he was putting more pressure on the tail than it
could bear. Why he didn't =97 and who's to blame for that =97 is the subje=

of a bitter fight between Airbus and American.=20
According to investigators, Molin tried to steady the aircraft using
pedals that control the rudder, a large flap on a plane's tail. When his
initial movement failed, Molin tried again and again. His actions placed
enormous stress on the tail.=20
American, the only U.S. airline to use that type of Airbus plane for
passenger service, claims Airbus didn't alert it to the danger of sharp
rudder movements until after the crash. The airline also contends the
Airbus A300-600 has uniquely sensitive flight controls that can cause more=

severe rudder movements than the pilot intends.=20
"Airbus had the ability to truly red-flag the issue," American spokesman
Bruce Hicks said.=20
Airbus says it told American a number of times and in a number of ways
that the airline was improperly training pilots about how to use the rudde=

An Airbus spokesman declined to comment on the investigation before the
hearing. However, the company has provided the NTSB (news - web sites)
with a number of documents to support its claim.=20
For example, a letter dated Aug. 20, 1997, warned American chief pilot
Cecil Ewing that rudders should not be moved abruptly to right a jetliner
or when a plane is flown at a sharp angle. The letter was signed by
representatives from The Boeing Co., the Federal Aviation Administration
(news - web sites) and Airbus.=20
Airbus contends that even people within American Airlines were concerned
about how the airline was training its pilots. A letter to Airbus dated
May 22, 1997, from American technical pilot David Tribout expressed
concern about the airline's then-new training course on advanced maneuvers=

"I am very concerned that one aspect of the course is inaccurate and
potentially hazardous," Tribout wrote. His concern: Pilots were being
taught that the rudder should be used to control a plane's rolling motion.=

Hicks countered that Airbus didn't share important safety information
about the rudder after a problem with American Flight 903 in May 1997.
During that incident, pilots used the rudder to steady an Airbus A300-600
plane on approach to West Palm Beach airport. The plane nearly crashed and=

one person was seriously injured.=20
Afterward, Airbus told the NTSB that it included a warning that abrupt
rudder movement in some circumstances "can lead to rapid loss of
controlled flight," and, in others, could break off the tail.=20
Hicks said Airbus' comments didn't specifically say the rudder movements
on Flight 903 had exposed the tail to so much pressure that it could have
been ripped off.=20
Immediately after the Flight 903 incident, an inspection found no damage
to the tail. But five years later, the plane was inspected more closely
because of concerns aroused by the crash of Flight 587. Cracks were found
and the tail was replaced.=20
John David, a spokesman for American Airlines' pilots union, said pilots
had always thought that they could use rudders to the full extent without
hurting the airplane. He also believes Airbus didn't properly communicate
what it knew.=20
American now gives its pilots specialized training on the rudder control
system based on information learned during the investigation.

BELOW IS A TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE DESIGN FLAWS IN THE A-300
'An Ext

It was not the pilots fault. It was the airplane's fault.

The Airbus A300

The Airbus family of aircraft is popularly used by carriers on a

Therefore, the pilot was a

Either the airplane was designed inadequately, maintenance was at fault,

The official report discounts maintenance and sabotage. That

"Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer" <nobody@cypherpunks.to> wrote
in message news:20041026180522.956A2116DE@mail.cypherpunks.to...
"Fault" is an irrelevant word in accident investigation. Events and
conditions leading up to and during the accident constitute the causes.
The pilot wig-wagged the rudder, which broke the tail. The pilot received
training that induced him to make agressive use of the rudder; and virtually
all pilots erroneously believed that no control input below maneuvering
speed could break the airplane. Engineers and others knew that rapid rudder
reversal could break the tail. Airbus designed the rudder input system so
that at higher speeds, less and less pedal input is needed to get full
deflection, whereas Boeing designs theirs so that at any speed, you need
full pedal depression to get full rudder. On and on. The money dispute
will boil down to whether, and how adequately, information about the ability
to break the tail was conveyed to American. IOW, plenty of "fault" to go
around for all.
is a flawed design. The proof lies in what is termed "manuevering speed," a
speed below which ANY control input CANNOT overload the airframe structure.
During the climb this plane never exceeded the manuevering speed.
Therefore, no excessive rudder input by the pilot was possible, by
definition.
Wrong, see previous.
world-wide
basis. The investigation could not blame the plane, even though the plane
is clearly at fault, for obvious reasons. To blame the plane would cause
world-wide disruption in the airline business.
Wrong. The A300 is a minuscule part of U.S. fleets, and it isn't a very big
component of the worldwide fleet, either. If there was a money motive for
the NTSB, an agency of the U.S. government, it would be to discredit Airbus
products to the benefit of Boeing. Three weeks ago the U.S. filed a
complaint with the World Trade Organization regarding government subsidies
to Airbus products, claiming they give Airbus an unfair advantage that has
allowed Airbus to surpass Boeing in sales.
convenient scapegoat. But blaming the crash on a dead man does not change
the truth.
No, it merely is part of the entire truth.
or
sabotaged.
Really? So improper operation of the aircraft cannot be a factor?
leaves design. It is advisable that you avoid the Airbus family whenever
there is a choice of plane.
Nonsense.

AA has a notorious habit of @$#*ing their employees.

If the NTSB found
"Pilot Error," I'm sure that Airbus must have conveyed those concerns
to AA, but that's probably as far as it got.

It might have even been
part of a failed test on a simulator. There must have been something
there that demonstrated that he either "knew or should have known"
about the problem with the rudder. I'd bet a dollar to a doughnut
that the real blame resides somewhere after American accepted the
aircraft into their fleet, and prior to the training of this
particular pilot. If that was the case, AA should find out who signed
off on the training program and remove them.

They should probably
ground the entire Airbus fleet world-wide to address the design flaws.

In the interim, urgent bulletins to Airbus Aircraft pilots should be
sent, and retraining conducted.

Actually American is pretty good
about correcting things after a disaster. I used to work in the
hangar where they brought the remains of flight 191, a DC10, on
5/25/79. Engine #1 came to rest about 50 yards from where I parked my

The ship turned sideways and crashed in a field just about a
mile away. It was full, due to United being on strike. 275 people
came back to the hangar, half of which became a temporary morgue for
six months. Body bags the size of your lunch. It was discovered that
cracked pylons (the things that attach the engines to the wing) were
to blame. All DC10s were grounded until they had all been fixed.

While the NTSB may be "legally correct" to call it pilot error,

I agree with your conclusion that Airbus is to blame.

Even if one
received specific training on how you have to go easy on the rudder,
in an emergency situation I think it unrealistic that a pilot should
be expected to recall that; "Oh yes, this plane is different from
every other one on the planet," in the midst of banging any controls
that he thinks will right the ship....And a simple "wig-wag" should
not initiate such destruction.

While the NTSB may be "legally correct" to call it pilot error, I
agree with your conclusion that Airbus is to blame. Even if one
received specific training on how you have to go easy on the rudder,
in an emergency situation I think it unrealistic that a pilot should
be expected to recall that; "Oh yes, this plane is different from
every other one on the planet," in the midst of banging any controls
that he thinks will right the ship....And a simple "wig-wag" should
not initiate such destruction.

"Bobby A" <ledfloyd2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:baf6c81a.0410310230.7537c60a@posting.google.com...
Airlines used to try to deflect blame by dumping on the crew - it's those
dumb pilots, not us, we're a safe airline! When liability claims went
through the roof, they realized that the pilot is an agent of the
corporation, and that blaming the pilots just made the case for the
plaintiffs. Which is why American played the more sophisticated strategy -
yeah, our pilot did that, but Airbus never told us that was a problem.
The probable cause statement is the least useful part of the investigation.
It's there only because Congress mandated it in NTSB's charter. The
findings and recommendations are a far better indicator of what happened.
To understand the accident reasonably well, you have to read the final
report. And if you really want to get down to the "nuts and bolts" level to
fully understand it, you have to read the entire docket.
It was an unfortunate conjunction of good intentions gone bad - upset
training, which encourages aggressive rudder - plus a pilot who didn't know
where to draw the line on rudder use.
Not justified, based on what is known.
Bulletins have gone out.
car.
!!!
Which turned out not to be necessary, since the problem was relatively
confined.
See my previous comment on probable cause.
There's a lot of "blame" to go around for everybody.
You can break a Boeing tail that way, too.