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ICHELLE MARVIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LEE MARVIN, Defendant and
Respondent
L.A. No. 30520
Supreme Court of California
18 Cal. 3d 660; 557 P.2d 106; 134 Cal. Rptr. 815; 1976 Cal. LEXIS 377
December 27, 1976
PRIOR-HISTORY: Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. C-23303, William A.
Munnell, Judge.
COUNSEL: Marvin M. Mitchelson, Donald N. Woldman, Robert M. Ross, Fleishman,
McDaniel, Brown & Weston and David M. Brown for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Jettie Pierce Selvig, Ruth Miller and Suzie S. Thorn as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Goldman & Kagon, Mark A. Goldman and William R. Bishin for Defendant and
Respondent.
Herma Hill Kay, John Sutter, Doris Brin Walker and Treuhaft, Walker, Nawi &
Hendon as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Isabella H. Grant and Livingston, Grant, Stone & Shenk as Amici Curiae.
JUDGES: Opinion by Tobriner, J., with Wright, C. J., McComb, Mosk, Sullivan
and Richardson, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring and dissenting opinion
by Clark, J.
OPINION BY: TOBRINER
OPINION
During the past 15 years, there has been a substantial increase in the
number of couples living together without marrying. 1 Such nonmarital
relationships lead to legal controversy when one partner dies or the couple
separates. Courts of Appeal, faced with the task of determining property
rights in such cases, have arrived at conflicting positions: two cases ( In
re Marriage of Cary (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 345 [109 Cal.Rptr. 862]; Estate of
Atherley (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 758 [119 Cal.Rptr. 41]) have held that the
Family Law Act ( Civ. Code, 4000 et seq.) requires division of the
property according to community property principles, and one decision (
Beckman v. Mayhew (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 529 [122 Cal.Rptr. 604]) has rejected
that holding. We take this opportunity to resolve that controversy and to
declare the principles which should govern distribution of property acquired
in a nonmarital relationship.
FOOTNOTES
1 "The 1970 census figures indicate that today perhaps eight times as many
couples are living together without being married as cohabited ten years
ago." (Comment, In re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation
(1974) 25 Hastings L.J. 1226.)
We conclude: (1) The provisions of the Family Law Act do not govern the
distribution of property acquired during a nonmarital relationship; such a
relationship remains subject solely to judicial decision. (2) The courts
should enforce express contracts between nonmarital partners except to the
extent that the contract is explicitly founded on the consideration of
meretricious sexual services. (3) In the absence of an express contract, the
courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether
that conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement of partnership or
joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties. The
courts may also employ the doctrine of quantum meruit, or equitable remedies
such as constructive or resulting trusts, when warranted by the facts of the
case.
In the instant case plaintiff and defendant lived together for seven years
without marrying; all property acquired during this period was taken in
defendant's name. When plaintiff sued to enforce a contract under which she
was entitled to half the property and to support payments, the trial court
granted judgment on the pleadings for defendant, thus leaving him with all
property accumulated by the couple during their relationship. Since the
trial court denied plaintiff a trial on the merits of her claim, its
decision conflicts with the principles stated above, and must be reversed.
1. The factual setting of this appeal.
Since the trial court rendered judgment for defendant on the pleadings, we
must accept the allegations of plaintiff's complaint as true, determining
whether such allegations state, or can be amended to state, a cause of
action. (See Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710,
714-715, fn. 3 [117 Cal.Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865]; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure
(2d ed. 1971) pp. 2817-2818.) We turn therefore to the specific allegations
of the complaint.
Plaintiff avers that in October of 1964 she and defendant "entered into an
oral agreement" that while "the parties lived together they would combine
their efforts and earnings and would share equally any and all property
accumulated as a result of their efforts whether individual or combined."
Furthermore, they agreed to "hold themselves out to the general public as
husband and wife" and that "plaintiff would further render her services as a
companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook to . . . defendant."
Shortly thereafter plaintiff agreed to "give up her lucrative career as an
entertainer [and] singer" in order to "devote her full time to defendant . .
.. as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook;" in return defendant
agreed to "provide for all of plaintiff's financial support and needs for
the rest of her life."
Plaintiff alleges that she lived with defendant from October of 1964 through
May of 1970 and fulfilled her obligations under the agreement. During this
period the parties as a result of their efforts and earnings acquired in
defendant's name substantial real and personal property, including motion
picture rights worth over $ 1 million. In May of 1970, however, defendant
compelled plaintiff to leave his household. He continued to support
plaintiff until November of 1971, but thereafter refused to provide further
support.
On the basis of these allegations plaintiff asserts two causes of action.
The first, for declaratory relief, asks the court to determine her contract
and property rights; the second seeks to impose a constructive trust upon
one half of the property acquired during the course of the relationship.
Defendant demurred unsuccessfully, and then answered the complaint. (See fn.
2.) Following extensive discovery and pretrial proceedings, the case came to
trial. 2 Defendant renewed his attack on the complaint by a motion to
dismiss. Since the parties had stipulated that defendant's marriage to Betty
Marvin did not terminate until the filing of a final decree of divorce in
January 1967, the trial court treated defendant's motion as one for judgment
on the pleadings augmented by the stipulation.
FOOTNOTES
2 When the case was called for trial, plaintiff asked leave to file an
amended complaint. The proposed complaint added two causes of action for
breach of contract against Santa Ana Records, a corporation not a party to
the action, asserting that Santa Ana was an alter ego of defendant. The
court denied leave to amend, and plaintiff claims that the ruling was an
abuse of discretion. We disagree; plaintiff's argument was properly rejected
by the Court of Appeal in the portion of its opinion quoted below.
No error was committed in denial of plaintiff's motion, made on the opening
day set for trial, seeking leave to file a proposed amended complaint which
would have added two counts and a new defendant to the action. As stated by
plaintiff's counsel at the hearing, "[There] is no question about it that we
seek to amend the Complaint not on the eve of trial but on the day of
trial."
In Hayutin v. Weintraub, 207 Cal.App.2d 497 [24 Cal.Rptr. 761], the court
said at pages 508-509 in respect to such a motion tha
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