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DOE V. CHAO (02-1377) Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-1377.ZS.html
Argued December 3, 2003 -- Decided February 24, 2004
Opinion author: Souter
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After petitioner Doe filed a black lung benefits claim
with the Department of Labor, the agency used his Social
Security number to identify his claim on official agency
documents, including a multicaptioned hearing notice that
was sent to a group of claimants, their employers, and
lawyers. Doe and other black lung claimants sued the
Department, claiming that such disclosures violated the
Privacy Act of 1974. The Government stipulated to an order
prohibiting future publication of Social Security numbers on
multicaptioned hearing notices, and the parties moved for
summary judgment. The District Court entered judgment
against all plaintiffs but Doe, finding that they had raised
no issues of cognizable harm. However, the court accepted
Doe's uncontroverted testimony about his distress on
learning of the improper disclosure, granted him summary
judgment, and awarded him $1,000, the minimum statutory
damages award under 5 U.S.C. sect. 552a(g)(4). The Fourth
Circuit reversed on Doe's claim, holding that the $1,000
minimum is available only to plaintiffs who suffer actual
damages, and that Doe had not raised a triable issue of fact
about such damages, having submitted no corroboration for
his emotional distress claim.
Held: Plaintiffs must prove some actual damages to qualify
for the minimum statutory award. Pp. 3-13.
(a) The Privacy Act gives agencies detailed instructions
for managing their records and provides various sorts of
civil relief to persons aggrieved by the Government's
failure to comply with the Act's requirements. Doe's claim
falls within a catchall category for someone who suffers an
"adverse effect" from a failure not otherwise specified in
the remedial section of the Act. sect.552a(g)(1)(D). If a
court determines in a subsection (g)(1)(D) suit that the
agency acted in an "intentional or willful" manner, the
Government is liable for "actual damages sustained by the
individual ... , but in no case shall a person entitled to
recovery receive less than ... $1,000." sect.552a(g)(4)(A).
Pp. 3-4.
(b) A straightforward textual analysis supports the
Government's position that the minimum guarantee goes only
to victims who prove some actual damages. By the time the
statute guarantees the $1,000 minimum, it not only has
confined eligibility to victims of adverse effects caused by
intentional or willful actions, but has provided expressly
for liability to such victims for "actual damages
sustained." When the next clause of the sentence containing
such an explicit provision guarantees $1,000 to the "person
entitled to recovery," the obvious referent is the
immediately preceding provision for recovering actual
damages, the Act's sole provision for recovering anything.
Doe's theory that the minimum requires nothing more than
proof of a statutory violation is immediately questionable
in ignoring the "actual damages" language so directly at
hand and instead looking for "a person entitled to recovery"
in a separate part of the statute devoid of any mention of
recovery or of what might be recovered. Doe ignores
statutory language by reading the statute to speak of
liability in a freestanding, unqualified way, when it
actually speaks in a limited way, by referencing enumerated
damages. His reading is also at odds with the traditional
understanding that tort recovery requires both wrongful act
plus causation and proof of some harm for which damages can
reasonably be assessed. And an uncodified provision of the
Act demonstrates that Congress left for another day the
question whether to authorize general damages, i.e., an
award calculated without reference to specific harm. In
fact, drafting history shows that Congress cut out the very
language in the bill that would have authorized such
damages. Finally, Doe's reading leaves the entitlement to
recovery reference with no job to do. As he treats the
text, Congress could have accomplished its object simply by
providing that the Government would be liable for actual
damages but in no case less than $1,000. Pp. 4-8.
(c) Doe's argument suggests that it would have been
illogical for Congress to create a cause of action for
anyone suffering an adverse effect from intentional or
willful agency action, then deny recovery without actual
damages. But subsection (g)(1)(D)'s recognition of a civil
action was not meant to provide a complete cause of action.
A subsequent provision requires proof of intent or
willfulness in addition to adverse effect, and if the
specific state of mind must be proven additionally, it is
consistent with logic to require some actual damages as
well. Doe also suggests that it is peculiar to offer
guaranteed damages, as a form of presumed damages not
requiring proof of amount, only to plaintiffs who can
demonstrate actual damages. But this approach parallels the
common-law remedial scheme for certain defamation claims in
which plaintiffs can recover presumed damages only if they
can demonstrate some actual, quantifiable pecuniary loss.
Finally, Doe points to subsequently enacted statutes with
remedial provisions similar to sect.552a(g)(4). However,
the text of one provision is too far different from the
Privacy Act's language to serve as a sound basis for
analogy; and even as to the other provisions, this Court has
said repeatedly that subsequent legislative history will
rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute
that can be gleaned from its language and legislative
history prior to its enactment. Pp. 9-12.
306 F.3d 170, affirmed.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.,
joined, and in which Scalia, J., joined except as to the
penultimate paragraph of Part III and footnote 8. Ginsburg,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Breyer,
JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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