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LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE -- CORNELL LAW SCHOOL
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GROH V. RAMIREZ (02-811)
Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-811.ZS.html
Argued November 4, 2003 -- Decided February 24, 2004
Opinion author: Stevens
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Petitioner, a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
agent, prepared and signed an application for a warrant to
search respondents' Montana ranch, which stated that the
search was for specified weapons, explosives, and records.
The application was supported by petitioner's detailed
affidavit setting forth his basis for believing that such
items were on the ranch and was accompanied by a warrant
form that he completed. The Magistrate Judge (Magistrate)
signed the warrant form even though it did not identify any
of the items that petitioner intended to seize. The portion
calling for a description of the "person or property"
described respondents' house, not the alleged weapons; the
warrant did not incorporate by reference the application's
itemized list. Petitioner led federal and local law
enforcement officers to the ranch the next day but found no
illegal weapons or explosives. Petitioner left a copy of the
warrant, but not the application, with respondents.
Respondents sued petitioner and others under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, and 42 U.S.C.
sect. 1983 claiming, inter alia, a Fourth Amendment
violation. The District Court granted the defendants
summary judgment, finding no Fourth Amendment violation, and
finding that even if such a violation occurred, the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed except as to the Fourth Amendment claim
against petitioner, holding that the warrant was invalid
because it did not describe with particularity the place to
be searched and the items to be seized. The court also
concluded that United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
precluded qualified immunity for petitioner because he was
the leader of a search who did not read the warrant and
satisfy himself that he understood its scope and limitations
and that it was not obviously defective.
Held:
1. The search was clearly "unreasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment. Pp. 5-11.
(a) The warrant was plainly invalid. It did not meet
the Fourth Amendment's unambiguous requirement that a
warrant "particularly describ[e] ... the persons or things
to be seized." The fact that the application adequately
described those things does not save the warrant; Fourth
Amendment interests are not necessarily vindicated when
another document says something about the objects of the
search, but that document's contents are neither known to
the person whose home is being searched nor available for
her inspection. It is not necessary to decide whether the
Amendment permits a warrant to cross-reference other
documents, because such incorporation did not occur here.
Pp. 5-6.
(b) Petitioner's argument that the search was
nonetheless reasonable is rejected. Because the warrant did
not describe the items at all, it was so obviously deficient
that the search must be regarded as warrantless, and thus
presumptively unreasonable. This presumptive rule applies
to searches whose only defect is a lack of particularity in
the warrant. Petitioner errs in arguing that such searches
should be exempt from the presumption if they otherwise
satisfy the particularity requirement's goals. Unless items
in the affidavit are set forth in the warrant, there is no
written assurance that the Magistrate actually found
probable cause for a search as broad as the affiant
requested. The restraint petitioner showed in conducting
the instant search was imposed by the agent himself, not a
judicial officer. Moreover, the particularity requirement's
purpose is not limited to preventing general searches; it
also assures the individual whose property is searched and
seized of the executing officer's legal authority, his need
to search, and the limits of his power to do so. This case
presents no occasion to reach petitioner's argument that the
particularity requirements' goals were served when he orally
described the items to respondents, because respondents
dispute his account. Pp. 6-11.
2. Petitioner is not entitled to qualified immunity despite
the constitutional violation because "it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted," Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
202. Given that the particularity requirement is stated in
the Constitution's text, no reasonable officer could believe
that a warrant that did not comply with that requirement was
valid. Moreover, because petitioner prepared the warrant, he
may not argue that he reasonably relied on the Magistrate's
assurance that it contained an adequate description and was
valid. Nor could a reasonable officer claim to be unaware
of the basic rule that, absent consent or exigency, a
warrantless search of a home is presumptively
unconstitutional. "[A] warrant may be so facially deficient
.... that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it
to be valid." Leon, 468 U.S., at 923. This is such a case.
Pp. 11-14.
298 F.3d 1022, affirmed.
Stevens, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J.,
joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Scalia, J., joined, and in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined as
to Part III.
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