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LOCKE V. DAVEY (02-1315)
Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-1315.ZS.html
Argued December 2, 2003 -- Decided February 25, 2004
Opinion author: Rehnquist
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Washington State established its Promise
Scholarship Program to assist academically gifted students with
postsecondary education expenses. In accordance with the State
Constitution, students may not use such a scholarship to pursue
a devotional theology degree. Respondent Davey was awarded a
Promise Scholarship and chose to attend Northwest College, a
private, church-affiliated institution that is eligible under
the program. When he enrolled, Davey chose a double major in
pastoral ministries and business management/administration. It
is undisputed that the pastoral ministries degree is
devotional. After learning that he could not use his
scholarship to pursue that degree, Davey brought this action
under 42 U.S. C. sect.1983 for an injunction and damages,
arguing that the denial of his scholarship violated, inter
alia, the First
Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
The District Court rejected Davey's constitutional claims
and granted the State summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit
reversed, concluding that, because the State had singled out
religion for unfavorable treatment, its exclusion of theology
majors had to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
state interest under Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520. Finding that the State's antiestablishment
concerns were not compelling, the court declared the program
unconstitutional.
Held: Washington's exclusion
of the pursuit of a devotional theology degree from its
otherwise-inclusive scholarship aid program does not violate
the Free Exercise Clause. This case involves the "play in
the joints" between the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New
York, 397 U.S.
664, 669. That is, it concerns state action that is
permitted by the former but not required by the latter. The
Court rejects Davey's contention that, under Lukumi,
supra, the program is presumptively unconstitutional
because it is not facially neutral with respect to religion.
To accept this claim would extend the Lukumi line of
cases well beyond not only their facts but their reasoning.
Here, the State's disfavor of religion (if it can be
called that) is of a far milder kind than in Lukumi,
where the ordinance criminalized the ritualistic animal
sacrifices of the Santeria religion. Washington's program
imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of
religious service or rite. It neither denies to ministers the
right to participate in community political affairs, see
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, nor
requires students to choose between their religious beliefs and
receiving a government benefit, see, e.g., Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136. The
State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of
instruction. Even though the differently worded Washington
Constitution draws a more stringent line than does the Federal
Constitution, the interest it seeks to further is scarcely
novel.In fact, there are few areas in which a State's
antiestablishment interests come more into play. Since this
country's founding, there have been popular uprisings
against procuring taxpayer funds to support church leaders,
which was one of the hallmarks of an "established"
religion. Most States that sought to avoid such an
establishment around the time of the founding placed in their
constitutions formal prohibitions against using tax funds to
support the ministry. That early state constitutions saw no
problem in explicitly excluding only the ministry from
receiving state dollars reinforces the conclusion that
religious instruction is of a different ilk from other
professions. Moreover, the entirety of the Promise Scholarship
Program goes a long way toward including religion in its
benefits, since it permits students to attend pervasively
religious schools so long as they are accredited, and students
are still eligible to take devotional theology courses under
the program's current guidelines.Nothing in the
Washington Constitution's history or text or in the
program's operation suggests animus towards religion.
Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, it
cannot be concluded that the denial of funding for vocational
religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally
suspect. Without a presumption of unconstitutionality,
Davey's claim must fail. The State's interest in not
funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial, and
the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden
on Promise Scholars. If any room exists between the two
Religion Clauses, it must be here. Pp. 4-12.
299 F.3d 748, reversed.
Rehnquist,
C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Thomas, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting
opinion.
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