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The following decisions have just arrived via the LII's
direct Project HERMES feed from the Supreme Court.
- Middleton v. McNeil <
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-1028.ZPC.html >
- Johnson v. California <
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-6539.ZPC.html >
- Scarborough v. Principi <
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-1657.ZS.html >
- Dretke v. Haley < http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/02-1824P.ZS >
- Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. <
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-1205.ZS.html >
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Scarborough v. Principi
< http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-1657.ZS.html >
Opinion-author: Ginsburg
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SYLLABUS
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
SCARBOROUGH v. PRINCIPI, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT
No. 021657. Argued February 23, 2004Decided May 3, 2004
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) authorizes the payment of
attorneys fees to a prevailing party in an action against the United
States absent a showing by the Government that its position in the
underlying litigation "was substantially justified." 28 U.S. C.
2412(d)(1)(A). Section 2412(d)(1)(B) sets a deadline of 30 days after
final judgment for the filing of a fee application and directs that
the application include: (1) a showing that the applicant is a
"prevailing party"; (2) a showing that the applicant is "eligible to
receive an award"; and (3) a statement of "the amount sought,
including an itemized statement from any attorney stating the actual
time expended and the rate" charged. Section 2412(d)(1)(B)s second
sentence further requires the applicant to "allege that the position
of the United States was not substantially justified."
Petitioner Scarborough prevailed before the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims (CAVC) in an action for disability benefits
against respondent Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Scarboroughs
counsel filed a timely application for attorneys fees and costs
pursuant to 2412(d), showing that Scarborough was the prevailing
party in the underlying litigation and was eligible to receive an
award. Counsel also stated the total amount sought, and itemized hours
and rates of work. But counsel failed initially to allege, in
addition, that "the position of the United States was not
substantially justified." 2412(d)(1)(B). The Secretary moved to
dismiss the application on the ground that the CAVC lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to award fees because Scarboroughs counsel had
failed to make the required no-substantial-justification allegation.
Scarboroughs counsel immediately filed an amended application adding
that allegation. In the interim between the initial filing and the
amendment, however, the 30-day fee application filing period had
expired. For that sole reason, the CAVC dismissed Scarboroughs fee
application.
In affirming, the Federal Circuit initially held that EAJA
plainly and unambiguously requires a party seeking fees under 2412(d)
to submit an application, including all enumerated allegations, within
the 30-day time limit. This Court granted certiorari, vacated the
judgment, and remanded the case in light of Edelman v. Lynchburg
College, 535 U.S. 106. In Edelman, the Court had upheld an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation allowing amendment
of an employment discrimination charge, timely filed under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to add, after the filing deadline,
the required, but initially absent, verification. Title VII, the Court
explained, permitted "relation back" of a verification missing from an
original filing. Id., at 115118. On remand, the Federal Circuit
adhered to its earlier decision, distinguishing Edelman on the ground
that, in Title VIIs remedial scheme, laypersons often initiate the
process, whereas EAJA is directed to attorneys. The appeals court also
observed that the timely filing and verification requirements at issue
in Edelman appear in separate statutory provisions, while EAJAs 30-
day filing deadline and the contents required for a fee application
are detailed in the same statutory provision. The Federal Circuit also
distinguished the holding in Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, that
a pro se litigants failure to hand sign a timely filed notice of
appeal is a nonjurisdictional, and therefore curable, defect. This
Court had noted in Becker, the Federal Circuit pointed out, that the
timing and signature requirements there at issue were found in
separate rules.
Held: A timely fee application, pursuant to 2412(d), may be amended
after the 30-day filing period has run to cure an initial failure to
allege that the Governments position in the underlying litigation
lacked substantial justification. Thus, Scarboroughs fee application,
as amended, qualifies for consideration and determination on the
merits. Pp. 920.
(a) Whether Scarborough is time barred by 2412(d)(1)(B) from
gaining the fee award authorized by 2412(d)(1)(A) does not concern
the federal courts "subject-matter jurisdiction." Rather, it concerns
a mode of relief (costs including legal fees) ancillary to the
judgment of a court that has plenary "jurisdiction of [the civil]
action" in which the fee application is made. See 2412(b) and
(d)(1)(A); 38 U.S. C. 7252(a). More particularly, the current dispute
presents a question of time. The issue is not whether, but when,
2412(d)(1)(A) and (B) require a fee applicant to "allege that the
position of the United States was not substantially justified."
Clarity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the
label "jurisdictional" not for such claim-processing rules, but only
for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter
jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a
courts adjudicatory authority. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S.___ , ___
(slip op., at 10). Section 2412(d)(1)(B) does not describe what
classes of cases the CAVC is competent to adjudicate, but relates only
to postjudgment proceedings auxiliary to cases already within that
courts adjudicatory authority. Pp. 911.
(b) Unlike the 2412(d)(1)(B) prescriptions on what the applicant
must show (his "prevailing party" status, "eligib[ility] to receive an
award," and "the amount sought, including an itemized statement"), the
required "no
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