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PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE V. SUDERS (03-95)
Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-95.ZS.html
Argued March 31, 2004 -- Decided June 14, 2004
Opinion author: Ginsburg
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In March 1998, the Pennsylvania State
Police (PSP) hired plaintiff-respondent Suders
to work as a police communications operator
for the McConnellsburg barracks, where her
male supervisors subjected her to a continuous
barrage of sexual harassment. In June 1998,
Suders told the PSP's Equal Employment
Opportunity Officer, Virginia Smith-Elliott,
that she might need help, but neither woman
followed up on the conversation. Two months
later, Suders contacted Smith-Elliott again,
this time reporting that she was being
harassed and was afraid. Smith-Elliott told
Suders to file a complaint, but did not tell
her how to obtain the necessary form.Two
days later, Suders' supervisors arrested her
for theft of her own computer-skills exam
papers. Suders had removed the papers after
concluding that the supervisors had falsely
reported that she had repeatedly failed, when
in fact, the exams were never forwarded for
grading.Suders then resigned from the force
and sued the PSP, alleging, inter alia, that
she had been subjected to sexual harassment
and constructively discharged, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The District Court granted the PSP's motion
for summary judgment. Although recognizing
that Suders' testimony would permit a fact
trier to conclude that her supervisors had
created a hostile work environment, the court
nevertheless held that the PSP was not
vicariously liable for the supervisors'
conduct. In support of its decision, the
District Court referred to Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808. In that case, and
in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, decided the same day, this Court
held that an employer is strictly liable for
supervisor harassment that "culminates in a
tangible employment action, such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment." 524
U.S., at 765. But when no such tangible
action is taken, both decisions also hold, the
employer may raise an affirmative defense to
liability. To prevail on the basis of the
defense, the employer must prove that "(a)
[it] exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior," and that (b) the employee
"unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise."Ibid. Suders' hostile work
environment claim was untenable as a matter of
law, the District Court stated, because she
unreasonably failed to avail herself of the
PSP's internal antiharassment procedures. The
court did not address Suders' constructive
discharge claim.
The Third Circuit reversed and remanded the
case for trial. The appeals court disagreed
with the District Court in two key respects:
First, even if the PSP could assert the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, genuine
issues of material fact existed about the
effectiveness of the PSP's program to address
sexual harassment claims; second, Suders had
stated a claim of constructive discharge due
to hostile work environment. The appeals
court ruled that a constructive discharge, if
proved, constitutes a tangible employment
action that renders an employer strictly
liable and precludes recourse to the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.
Held: To establish "constructive discharge," a
plaintiff alleging sexual harassment must show
that the abusive working environment became so
intolerable that her resignation qualified as
a fitting response. An employer may assert
the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to
such a claim unless the plaintiff quit in
reasonable response to an adverse action
officially changing her employment status or
situation, e.g., a humiliating demotion,
extreme cut in pay, or transfer to a position
in which she would face unbearable working
conditions. Pp. 9-21.
(a) Under the constructive discharge
doctrine, an employee's reasonable decision to
resign because of unendurable working
conditions is assimilated to a formal
discharge for remedial purposes. The inquiry
is objective: Did working conditions become so
intolerable that a reasonable person in the
employee's position would have felt compelled
to resign? This doctrine was developed by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in the
1930's, and was solidly established in the
lower federal courts by 1964, when Title VII
was enacted. The Court agrees that Title VII
encompasses employer liability for a
constructive discharge. Pp. 9-11.
(b) This case concerns employer liability
for one subset of constructive discharge
claims: those resulting from sexual
harassment, or "hostile work environment,"
attributable to a supervisor. The Court's
starting point is the Ellerth/Faragher
framework. Those decisions delineate two
categories of sexual harassment claims: (1)
those alleging a "tangible employment action,"
for which employers may be held strictly
liable; and (2) those asserting no tangible
employment action, in which case employers may
assert the affirmative defense. Ellerth, 524
U.S., at 765. The key issues here are: Into
which Ellerth/Faragher category hostile-
environment constructive discharge claims
fall, and what proof burdens the parties bear
in such cases. In Ellerth and Faragher, the
Court invoked the principle drawn from agency
law that an employer is liable for the acts of
its agent when the agent is "aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation." Id., at 758. When a
supervisor engaged in harassing conduct takes
a tangible employment action against a
subordinate, the Court reasoned, it is beyond
question that the supervisor is aided by the
agency relation. A tangible employment
action, the Court stated, is an "official act
of the enterprise" and "fall[s] within the
special province of the supervisor." Id., at
762.In contrast, when supervisor harassment
does not culminate in a tangible employment
action, Ellerth and Faragher explained, it is
less obvious that the agency relation is the
driving force.The Court also rec
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