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LEOCAL V. ASHCROFT (03-583)
Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-583.ZS.html
Argued October 12, 2004 -- Decided November 9, 2004
Opinion author: Rehnquist
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Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of
the United States, pleaded guilty to two counts of driving
under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and causing serious bodily
injury in an accident, in violation of Florida law. While he
was serving his prison sentence, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) initiated removal proceedings
pursuant to sect.237(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), which permits deportation of an alien convicted of
"an aggravated felony." INA sect.101(a)(43)(F)
defines "aggravated felony" to include, inter
alia, "a crime of violence [as defined in 18 U.S.C. sect. 16]
for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one
year."Title 18 U.S.C. sect. 16(a), in turn, defines "crime
of violence" as "an offense that has as an
element the use ... of physical force against the person or
property of another," and sect.16(b) defines it as
"any other offense that is a felony and that, by its
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against
the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense." An Immigration Judge and the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordered petitioner's
deportation, and the Eleventh Circuit dismissed his petition
for review, relying on its precedent that a conviction under
Florida's DUI statute is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. sect.
16.
Held: State DUI offenses such as Florida's, which either do not
have a mens rea component or require only a showing of negligence
in the operation of a vehicle, are not crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. sect.
16.
Pp. 4-11.
(a) Section 16
requires this Court to look to the elements and nature of the
offense of conviction in determining whether petitioner's
conviction falls within its ambit. Florida's DUI statute,
like similar statutes in many States, requires proof of
causation but not of any mental state; and some other States
appear to require only proof that a person acted negligently in
operating the vehicle.This Court's analysis begins with
sect.16's language. See Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S.
137, 144. Particularly when interpreting a statute
featuring as elastic a word as "use," the Court
construes language in its context and in light of the terms
surrounding it. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229.
Section 16(a)'s critical aspect is that a crime of
violence involves the "use ... of physical force
against" another's person or property.That requires
active employment. See Bailey, supra, at 145.While
one may, in theory, actively employ something in an
accidental manner, it is much less natural to say that a person
actively employs physical force against another by accident.
When interpreting a statute, words must be given their
"ordinary or natural" meaning, Smith, supra,
at 228, and sect.16(a)'s key phrase most naturally
suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely
accidental conduct. Petitioner's DUI offense therefore is
not a crime of violence under sect.16(a).
Pp. 4-8.
(b) Nor is it a crime of violence under sect.16(b), which
sweeps more broadly than sect.16(a), but does not thereby
encompass all negligent conduct, such as negligent operation of a
vehicle. It simply covers offenses that naturally involve a person
acting in disregard of the risk that physical force might be
used against another in committing an offense.The classic
example is burglary, which, by nature, involves a substantial
risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in
completing the crime. Thus, sect.16(b) contains the same
formulation found to be determinative in sect.16(a): the use
of physical force against another's person or property.
Accordingly, sect.16(b)'s language must be given an
identical construction, requiring a higher mens rea than
the merely accidental or negligent conduct involved in a DUI
offense. Pp. 8-9.
(c) The ordinary meaning of the term "crime of violence,"
which is what this Court is ultimately determining, combined
with sect.16's emphasis on the use of physical force
against another (or the risk of having to use such force in
committing a crime), suggests a category of violent, active
crimes that cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses.
This construction is reinforced by INA sect.101(h), which
includes as alternative definitions of "serious criminal
offense" a "crime of violence, as defined in
[sect.16]," sect.101(h)(2), and a DUI-causing-injury
offense, sect.101(h)(3). Interpreting sect.16 to include DUI
offenses would leave sect.101(h)(3) practically void of
significance, in contravention of the rule that effect should
be given to every word of a statute whenever possible, see
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174.
Pp. 9-11.
(d) This case does not present the question whether an
offense requiring proof of the reckless use of force against
another's person or property qualifies as a crime of
violence under sect.16. P. 11.
Reversed and remanded.
Rehnquist,
C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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