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COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC. V. AVIALL SERVICES, INC. (02-1192)
Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-1192.ZS.html
Argued October 6, 2004 -- Decided December 13, 2004
Opinion author: Thomas
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The enabling clause of sect. 113(f)(1) of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as added by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), provides
that any person "may" seek contribution from any
other person liable or potentially liable under CERCLA
sect. 107(a) "during or following any civil action"
under CERCLA sect. 106 (which authorizes the Federal Government
to compel responsible parties to clean up contaminated areas,
see Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814),
or CERCLA sect. 107(a) (which empowers the Government to
recover its response costs from potentially responsible persons
(PRPs)). Section 113(f)(1)'s saving clause provides:
"Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of
any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence
of a civil action under" sect. 106 or sect. 107.SARA
also created a separate express right of contribution,
sect. 113(f)(3)(B), for "[a] person who has resolved its
liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a
response action or for some or all of the costs of such action
in an administrative or judicially approved
settlement."
Cooper Industries, Inc., owned four Texas properties until 1981,
when it sold them to Aviall Services, Inc. After operating those
sites for several years, Aviall discovered that both it and
Cooper had contaminated them when hazardous substances leaked
into the ground and ground water. Aviall notified the State of
the contamination, but neither the State nor the Federal
Government took judicial or administrative measures to compel
cleanup. Aviall cleaned up the properties under the
State's supervision and sold them to a third party, but
remains contractually responsible for $5 million or more in
cleanup costs.Aviall filed this action against Cooper to
recover such costs. The original complaint asserted, inter
alia, a claim for cost recovery under sect. 107(a) and a
separate claim for contribution under sect. 113(f)(1).Aviall
later amended the complaint to, among other things, combine its
two CERCLA claims into a single, joint claim that, pursuant to
sect. 113(f)(1), sought contribution from Cooper as a PRP under
sect. 107(a). Granting Cooper summary judgment, the District
Court held that Aviall had abandoned its freestanding sect. 107
claim, and that contribution under sect. 113(f)(1) was
unavailable because Aviall had not been sued under sect. 106 or
sect. 107. The Fifth Circuit ultimately reversed, holding that
sect. 113(f)(1) allows a PRP to obtain contribution from other
PRPs regardless of whether the PRP has been sued under
sect. 106 or sect. 107. The court reasoned in part that
"may" in sect. 113(f)(1)'s enabling clause did
not mean "may only."
Held: A private party who has not been sued under CERCLA sect. 106
or sect. 107(a) may not obtain contribution under sect. 113(f)(1)
from other liable parties.
Pp. 6-12.
(a) Section
113(f)(1) does not authorize Aviall's suit. This Court
disagrees with Aviall's argument that the word
"may" in sect. 113(f)(1)'s enabling clause
should be read permissively, such that "during or
following" a civil action is one, but not the exclusive,
instance in which a person may seek contribution. First, the
natural meaning of "may" in this context is that it
authorizes certain contribution actions that satisfy the
subsequent specified condition--i.e., those that
occur "during or following" a specified civil
action--and no others.Second, reading sect. 113(f)(1) to
authorize contribution actions at any time, regardless of the
existence of a sect. 106 or sect. 107(a) civil action, would
render entirely superfluous the section's explicit
"during or following" condition, as well as
sect. 113(f)(3)(B), which permits contribution actions after
settlement. This Court is loath to allow such a reading. See,
e.g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. ___, ___.
Congress would not have bothered to specify conditions under
which a person may bring a contribution claim, and at the same
time allowed contribution actions absent those conditions.
Section sect. 113(f)(1)'s saving clause does not change
the Court's conclusion. That clause's sole function
is to clarify that sect. 113(f)(1) does nothing to
"diminish" any cause(s) of action for contribution
that may exist independently of sect. 113(f)(1), thereby
rebutting any presumption that the express right of
contribution provided by the enabling clause is the exclusive
contribution cause of action available to a PRP. The saving
clause, however, does not itself establish a cause of action,
nor expand sect. 113(f)(1) to authorize contribution actions
not brought "during or following" a sect. 106 or
sect. 107(a) civil action, nor specify what causes of action
for contribution, if any, exist outside sect. 113(f)(1).
Reading the clause to authorize sect. 113(f)(1) contribution
actions not just "during or following" a civil
action, but also before such an action, would again violate the
settled rule that the Court must, if possible, construe a
statute to give every word some operative effect. In light of
provisions specifying two 3-year limitations periods for
contribution actions beginning at the date of judgment,
sect. 113(g)(3)(A), and at the date of settlement,
sect. 113(g)(3)(B), the absence of any such provision for cases
in which a judgment or settlement never occurs also supports
the conclusion that, to assert a contribution claim under
sect. 113(f), a party must satisfy the conditions of either
sect. 113(f)(1) or sect. 113(f)(3)(B).Given the clear meaning
of CERCLA's text, there is no need to resolve the
parties' dispute about CERCLA's purpose or to consult
that purpose at all. See Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79.
Because Aviall has never been subject to a civil action under
sect. 106 or sect. 107(a), it has no sect. 113(f)(1) claim.
Pp. 6-9.
(b) The Court declines to address in the first instance
Aviall's claim that it may recover costs under sect. 107(a)(4)(B)
Even though it is a PRP. In view of the importance of the sect.
107 issue, the
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