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CLARK V. MARTINEZ (03-878)
Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-878.ZS.html
Argued October 13, 2004 -- Decided January 12, 2005*
Opinion author: Scalia
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If an alien is found inadmissible and ordered
removed, the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)
ordinarily must remove the alien from the country within 90
days. 8 U.S.C. sect.
1231(a)(1)(A).Here, Martinez, respondent in No.
03-878, and Benitez, petitioner in No. 03-7434, Cuban
nationals who are both inadmissible under sect. 1182, were
ordered removed, but were detained beyond the 90-day removal
period. Each filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his
continued detention. In Martinez's case, the District
Court found that removal was not reasonably foreseeable and
ordered that Martinez be released under appropriate conditions.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. In Benitez's case, the
District Court also accepted that removal would not occur in
the foreseeable future, but nonetheless denied the petition.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Held:
1. Under sect. 1231(a)(6), the Secretary may detain inadmissible aliens
beyond the 90-day removal period, but only for so long as is
reasonably necessary to achieve removal. Section
1231(a)(6)'s operative language, "may be detained
beyond the removal period," applies equally to all aliens
that are its subject, whether or not those aliens have been
admitted to the country. In Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678,
this Court interpreted sect. 1231(a)(6) to authorize the
detention of aliens who have been admitted to the country only
as long as "reasonably necessary" to effectuate their
removal. Id., at 689, 699. This interpretation must
apply to inadmissible aliens as well. Even if the statutory
purpose and constitutional concerns influencing the
Zadvydas construction are not present for inadmissible
aliens, that cannot justify giving the same statutory
text a different meaning depending on the characteristics of
the aliens involved. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, Raygor
v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, and
Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456,
distinguished.Moreover, contrary to the Government's
argument, nothing in Zadvydas indicates that
sect. 1231(a)(6) authorizes detention until it approaches
constitutional limits.Nor does sect. 1182(d)(5) independently
authorize continued detention of these aliens. Pp.
5-14.
2. In Zadvydas, the Court further held that the
presumptive period during which an alien's detention is
reasonably necessary to effectuate removal is six months, and
that he must be conditionally released after that time if he
can demonstrate that there is "no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future."533
U.S., at 701. The Government having suggested no reason
that the time reasonably necessary for removal is longer for an
inadmissible alien, this same 6-month presumptive detention
period applies in these cases.Because both Martinez
and Benitez were detained well beyond six months after their
removal orders became final, the Government has brought forward
nothing to indicate that a substantial likelihood of removal
subsists, and the District Court in each case has determined
that removal to Cuba is not reasonably foreseeable, the habeas
petitions should have been granted. Pp. 14-15.
No. 03-878, affirmed; No. 03-7434,
337 F.3d 1289, reversed; and both cases remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
O'Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion.Thomas, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J.,
joined as to Part I-A.
Notes
*. Together with No. 03-7434,
Benitez v. Rozos, Field Office Director, Miami,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, on certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
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