|
--------------------------------------------------------------
AN E-BULLETIN
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE -- CORNELL LAW SCHOOL
lii\@lii.law.cornell.edu
---------------------------------------------------------------
The following decisions have just arrived via the LII's
direct Project HERMES feed from the Supreme Court.
===============================================================
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER (04-104)
Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-104.ZS.html
Argued October 4, 2004 -- Decided January 12, 2005*
Opinion author: Stevens
===============================================================
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the
sentence authorized by the jury verdict in respondent
Booker's drug case was 210-to-262 months in prison. At
the sentencing hearing, the judge found additional facts by a
preponderance of the evidence.Because these findings mandated
a sentence between 360 months and life, the judge gave Booker a
30-year sentence instead of the 21-year, 10-month, sentence he
could have imposed based on the facts proved to the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt. The Seventh Circuit held that this
application of the Guidelines conflicted with the
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490,
holding that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Relying on
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, the court
held that the sentence violated the Sixth Amendment and
instructed the District Court either to sentence Booker within
the sentencing range supported by the jury's findings or
to hold a separate sentencing hearing before a jury. In
respondent Fanfan's case, the maximum sentence authorized
by the jury verdict under the Guidelines was 78 months in
prison. At the sentencing hearing, the District Judge found by
a preponderance of the evidence additional facts authorizing a
sentence in the 188-to-235-month range, which would have
required him to impose a 15- or 16-year sentence instead of the
5 or 6 years authorized by the jury verdict alone. Relying on
Blakely's majority opinion, statements in its
dissenting opinions, and the Solicitor General's brief in
Blakely, the judge concluded that he could not follow
the Guidelines and imposed a sentence based solely upon the
guilty verdict in the case. The Government filed a notice of
appeal in the First Circuit and a petition for certiorari
before judgment in this Court.
Held: The judgment of the Court
of Appeals in No. 04-104 is affirmed, and the case is
remanded. The judgment of the District Court in No.
04-105 is vacated, and the case is remanded.
No. 04-104, 375 F.3d 508, affirmed and
remanded; and No. 04-105, vacated and remanded.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court in part, concluding that the
Sixth Amendment
as construed in Blakely applies to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.Pp. 5-20.
(a) In addressing Washington State's determinate sentencing
scheme, the Blakely Court found that Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227;
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466; and
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, made
clear "that the 'statutory maximum' for
Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 542 U.S.,
at ___. As Blakely's dissenting opinions
recognized, there is no constitutionally significant
distinction between the Guidelines and the Washington procedure
at issue in that case.This conclusion rests on the premise,
common to both systems, that the relevant sentencing rules are
mandatory and impose binding requirements on all sentencing
judges. Were the Guidelines merely advisory--recommending,
but not requiring, the selection of particular sentences in
response to differing sets of facts--their use would not
implicate the Sixth
Amendment.However, that is not the case.Title 18
U.S.C. A. sect. 3553(b) directs that a court
"shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within
the range" established by the Guidelines, subject to
departures in specific, limited cases.Because they are
binding on all on judges, this Court has consistently held that
the Guidelines have the force and effect of laws. Further, the
availability of a departure where the judge "finds ...
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that described,"
sect. 3553(b)(1), does not avoid the constitutional issue.
Departures are unavailable in most cases because the Commission
will have adequately taken all relevant factors into account,
and no departure will be legally permissible. In those
instances, the judge is legally bound to impose a sentence
within the Guidelines range. Booker's case illustrates
this point. The jury found him guilty of possessing at least
50 grams of crack cocaine, based on evidence that he had 92.5
grams.Under those facts, the Guidelines required a possible
210-to-262-month sentence. To reach Booker's actual
sentence--which was almost 10 years longer--the judge
found that he possessed an additional 566 grams of crack.
Although, the jury never heard any such evidence, the judge
found it to be true by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus,
as in Blakely, "the jury's verdict alone does
not authorize the sentence. The judge acquires that authority
only upon finding some additional fact." 542 U.S., at
___. Finally, because there were no factors the Sentencing
Commission failed to adequately consider, the judge was
required to impose a sentence within the higher Guidelines
range.Pp. 5-12.
(b) The Government's arguments for its position that
Blakely's reasoning should not be applied to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are unpersuasive. The fact that
the Guidelines are promulgated by the Sentencing Commission,
rather than Congress, is constitutionally irrelevant. The
Court has not previously considered the question, but the same
Sixth Amendment
principles apply to the Sentencing Guidelines.Further, the
Court's pre-Apprendi cases considering the
Guidelines are inapplicable, as they did not consider the
application of Apprendi to the Sentencing Guidelines.
Finally, separation of powers concerns are not present here,
and were rejected in Mistretta. In Mistretta the
Court concluded that even though the Commission performed
political rather than adjudicatory functions, Congress did not
exceed constitutional limitations in creating the Commission.
488 U.S., at 393, 388.That conclusion remains true regardless
of whether the facts relevant to sentencing are labeled
"sentencing factors" or "ele
|
| |
| |
|
