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AN E-BULLETIN
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE -- CORNELL LAW SCHOOL
lii\@lii.law.cornell.edu
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BATES V. DOW AGROSCIENCES LLC (03-388)
Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-388.ZS.html
Argued January 10, 2005 -- Decided April 27, 2005
Opinion author: Stevens
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Petitioner Texas peanut farmers allege that
their crops were severely damaged by the application of
respondent's (Dow) "Strongarm" pesticide, which
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) registered pursuant
to its authority under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Petitioners gave Dow notice of their
intent to sue, claiming that Strongarm's label recommended
its use in all peanut-growing areas when Dow knew or should
have known that it would stunt the growth of peanuts in their
soil, which had pH levels of at least 7.0. In response, Dow
sought a declaratory judgment in the Federal District Court,
asserting that FIFRA pre-empted petitioners' claims.
Petitioners counterclaimed, raising several state-law claims
sounding in strict liability, negligence, fraud, and breach of
express warranty. The District Court rejected one claim on
state-law grounds and found the others barred by FIFRA's
pre-emption provision, 7 U.S.C. sect.
136v(b). Affirming, the Fifth Circuit held that
sect.136v(b) expressly pre-empted the state-law claims because
a judgment against Dow would induce it to alter its product
label.
Held:
1. Under FIFRA,
which was comprehensively amended in 1972, a manufacturer must
obtain permission to market a pesticide by submitting a
proposed label and supporting data to EPA, which will register
the pesticide if it is efficacious, it will not cause
unreasonable adverse effects on humans and the environment, and
its label complies with the statute's misbranding
prohibition. A pesticide is "misbranded" if its
label, for example, contains a statement that is "false or
misleading," sect.136(q)(1)(A), or lacks adequate
instructions or warnings, sects.136(q)(1)(F), (G). A
State may regulate the sale and use of federally registered
pesticides to the extent that regulation does not permit any
sales or uses prohibited by FIFRA, sect.136v(a), but
"[s]uch State shall not impose or continue in effect any
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or
different from those required under [FIFRA],"
sect.136v(b).Though tort litigation against pesticide
manufacturers was a common feature of the legal landscape in
1972, after this Court held in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, that the term "requirement" in the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 included common-law
duties, and therefore pre-empted certain tort claims against
cigarette companies, courts began holding that sect.136v(b)
pre-empted claims such as petitioners'.
Pp. 4-9.
2. FIFRA's pre-emption
provision applies only to state-law "requirements for
labeling or packaging." sect.136v(b).While the Fifth
Circuit was correct that "requirements" embraces both
positive enactments and common-law duties, it erred in
supposing that petitioners' defective design, defective
manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty
claims were premised on requirements for labeling or
packaging.None of the common-law rules upon which these
claims are based requires that manufacturers label or package
their products in any particular way. The Fifth Circuit
reached a contrary conclusion by reasoning that a finding of
liability on these claims would induce Dow to alter its label.
This was error because the prohibitions of sect.136v(b) apply
only to "requirements." A requirement is a rule of
law that must be obeyed; an event, such as a jury verdict, that
merely motives an optional decision is not a requirement. The
proper inquiry calls for an examination of the elements of the
common-law duty at issue, not for speculation as to whether a
jury verdict will prompt the manufacturer to change its label.
Pp. 9-13.
3. Petitioners' fraud and
negligent-failure-to-warn claims, by contrast, are based on
common-law rules that qualify as "requirements for
labeling or packaging," since these rules set a standard
for a product's labeling that Dow is alleged to have
violated. While these common-law rules are subject to
sect.136v(b), it does not automatically follow that they are
pre-empted. Unlike the pre-emption clause in Cipollone,
sect.136v(b) prohibits only state-law labeling requirements
that are "in addition to or different from"
FIFRA's labeling requirements.Thus, sect.136v(b)
pre-empts any statutory or common-law rule that would impose a
labeling requirement that diverges from those set out in FIFRA
and its implementing regulations. It does not pre-empt a
state-law requirement that is equivalent to, and fully
consistent with, FIFRA's labeling standards. This
"parallel requirements" reading of sect.136v(b)
finds strong support in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470.
Thus, although FIFRA does not provide a federal remedy to those
injured as a result of a manufacturer's violation of
FIFRA's labeling requirements, nothing in sect.136v(b)
precludes States from providing such a remedy.Dow's
contrary reading of sect.136v(b) fails to make sense of the
phrase "in addition to or different from." Even if
Dow offered a plausible alternative reading of sect.136v(b),
this Court would have a duty to accept the reading disfavoring
pre-emption. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655.
The long history of tort litigation against manufacturers of
poisonous substances adds force to the presumption against
pre-emption, for Congress surely would have expressed its
intention more clearly if it had meant to deprive injured
parties of a long available form of compensation. Moreover,
this history emphasizes the importance of providing an
incentive to manufacturers to use the utmost care in
distributing inherently dangerous items. Finally, the policy
objections raised against this Court's reading of
sect.136v(b) are unpersuasive.Pp. 13-20.
4. Under the
"parallel requirements" reading of sect.136v(b), a
state-law labeling requirement must be equivalent to its
federal counterpart to avoid pre-emption. State law need not,
however, explicitly incorporate FIFRA's standards as an
element of a cause of action. Because this Court has not
received sufficient briefing on whether the Texas law governing
petitioners' fraud and failure-to-warn claims is
equivalent to FIFRA's misbranding standards and any
relevant regulations, it is up to the Fifth Circuit to resolve
the issue in the first instance. Pp. 20-21.
332 F.3d 323, vacated and remanded.
Stevens, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgme
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