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GONZALEZ V. CROSBY (04-6432)
Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-6432.ZS.html
Argued April 25, 2005 -- Decided June 23, 2005
Opinion author: Scalia
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Petitioner's federal habeas corpus
petition was dismissed as time barred when the District Court
concluded that the federal limitations period was not tolled
while petitioner's motion for postconviction relief was
pending in state court. After petitioner abandoned his attempt
to seek review of the District Court's decision, this
Court decided that a state postconviction relief petition can
toll the federal statute of limitations even if, like
petitioner's, the petition is ultimately dismissed as
procedurally barred. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4. Petitioner
filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion for
relief from the judgment, which the District Court denied. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that the Rule
60(b) motion was in substance a second or successive habeas
petition, which under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. sect.
2244(b), cannot be filed without precertification by the
court of appeals.
Held:
1. Because
petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion challenged only the
District Court's previous ruling on AEDPA's statute
of limitations, it is not the equivalent of a successive habeas
petition and can be ruled upon by the District Court without
precertification by the Eleventh Circuit.
Pp. 3-11.
(a) Rule
60(b) applies in sect.2254 habeas proceedings only "to
the extent that [it is] not inconsistent with" applicable
federal statutes and rules. sect.2254 Rule 11. Because
sect.2244(b) applies only where a court acts pursuant to a
prisoner's "habeas corpus application," the
question here is whether a Rule 60(b) motion is such an
application. The text of sect.2244(b) shows that, for these
purposes, a habeas application is a filing containing one or
more "claims."Other federal habeas statutes and
this Court's decisions also make clear that a
"claim" is an asserted federal basis for relief from
a state-court conviction. If a Rule 60(b) motion contains one
or more "claims," the motion is, if not in substance
a "habeas corpus application," at least similar
enough that failing to subject it to AEDPA's restrictions
on successive habeas petitions would be "inconsistent
with" the statute. A Rule 60(b) motion can be said to
bring a "claim" if it seeks to add a new ground for
relief from the state conviction or attacks the federal
court's previous resolution of a claim on the
merits, though not if it merely attacks a defect in the
federal habeas proceedings' integrity.Pp. 3-8.
(b) When
no "claim" is presented, there is no basis for
contending that a Rule 60(b) motion should be treated like a
habeas petition. If neither the motion itself nor the federal
judgment from which it seeks relief substantively addresses
federal grounds for setting aside the movant's state
conviction, allowing the motion to proceed on its own terms
creates no inconsistency with the habeas statute or rules.
Petitioner's motion, which alleges that the federal courts
misapplied sect.2244(d)'s statute of limitations, fits
this description. Nothing in Calderon v.
Thompson, 523
U.S. 538, suggests that entertaining a filing confined to a
nonmerits aspect of the first federal habeas proceeding
is "inconsistent with" AEDPA. Pp. 8-11.
2. Under the
proper Rule 60(b) standards, the District Court was correct to
deny relief. The change in the law worked by Artuz is
not an "extraordinary circumstance" justifying relief
under Rule 60(b)(6), and it is made all the less extraordinary
by the lack of diligence that petitioner showed in seeking
direct appellate review of the statute-of-limitations issue.
Pp. 11-13.
366 F.3d 1253, affirmed.
Scalia, J., delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and
O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion. Stevens, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined.
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