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KELO V. NEW LONDON (04-108)
Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-108.ZS.html
Argued February 22, 2005 -- Decided June 23, 2005
Opinion author: Stevens
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After approving an integrated development
plan designed to revitalize its ailing economy, respondent
city, through its development agent, purchased most of the
property earmarked for the project from willing sellers, but
initiated condemnation proceedings when petitioners, the owners
of the rest of the property, refused to sell. Petitioners
brought this state-court action claiming, inter alia,
that the taking of their properties would violate the
"public use" restriction in the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause. The trial court granted a
permanent restraining order prohibiting the taking of the some
of the properties, but denying relief as to others. Relying on
cases such as Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, and Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, the
Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part, upholding all of the proposed takings.
Held: The city's proposed
disposition of petitioners' property qualifies as a
"public use" within the meaning of the Takings
Clause. Pp. 6-20.
(a) Though the
city could not take petitioners' land simply to confer a
private benefit on a particular private party, see, e.g.,
Midkiff, 467 U.S., at 245, the takings at issue here would
be executed pursuant to a carefully considered development
plan, which was not adopted "to benefit a particular class
of identifiable individuals," ibid. Moreover,
while the city is not planning to open the condemned
land--at least not in its entirety--to use by the
general public, this "Court long ago rejected any literal
requirement that condemned property be put into use for the
.... public." Id., at 244. Rather, it has
embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public
use as "public purpose." See, e.g.,
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112,
158-164. Without exception, the Court has defined that
concept broadly, reflecting its longstanding policy of
deference to legislative judgments as to what public needs
justify the use of the takings power. Berman, 348 U.S. 26;
Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986.
Pp. 6-13.
(b) The
city's determination that the area at issue was
sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic
rejuvenation is entitled to deference.The city has carefully
formulated a development plan that it believes will provide
appreciable benefits to the community, including, but not
limited to, new jobs and increased tax revenue. As with other
exercises in urban planning and development, the city is trying
to coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and
recreational land uses, with the hope that they will form a
whole greater than the sum of its parts. To effectuate this
plan, the city has invoked a state statute that specifically
authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote economic
development. Given the plan's comprehensive character,
the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the
limited scope of this Court's review in such cases, it is
appropriate here, as it was in Berman, to resolve the
challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis,
but rather in light of the entire plan. Because that plan
unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged
here satisfy the Fifth Amendment.
P. 13.
(c) Petitioners' proposal
that the Court adopt a new bright-line rule that economic
development does not qualify as a public use is supported by
neither precedent nor logic. Promoting economic development is
a traditional and long accepted governmental function, and
there is no principled way of distinguishing it from the other
public purposes the Court has recognized. See, e.g.,
Berman, 348 U.S., at 24. Also rejected is
petitioners' argument that for takings of this kind the
Court should require a "reasonable certainty" that
the expected public benefits will actually accrue. Such a rule
would represent an even greater departure from the Court's
precedent. E.g., Midkiff, 467 U.S., at 242. The
disadvantages of a heightened form of review are especially
pronounced in this type of case, where orderly implementation
of a comprehensive plan requires all interested parties'
legal rights to be established before new construction can
commence. The Court declines to second-guess the wisdom of the
means the city has selected to effectuate its plan.
Berman, 348 U.S., at 26. Pp. 13-20.
268 Conn. 1, 843 A. 2d 500,
affirmed.
Stevens, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a
concurring opinion. O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas,
JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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