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FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP. v. HOLOWECKI (06-1322 Syllabus)
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-1322.ZS.html
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FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP. v. HOLOWECKI (No. 06-1322)
Web-accessible at:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-1322.ZS.html
Argued: November 6, 2007 -- Decided: February 27, 2008
Opinion author: Kennedy
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The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)
requires that "[n]o civil action ... be commenced ... until
60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination
has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission"
(EEOC), 29 U. S. C. sec. 626(d), but does not define the
term "charge." After petitioner delivery service (FedEx)
initiated programs tying its couriers' compensation and
continued employment to certain performance benchmarks,
respondent Kennedy (hereinafter respondent), a FedEx courier
over age 40, filed with the EEOC, in December 2001, a Form
283 "Intake Questionnaire" and a detailed affidavit supporting
her contention that the FedEx programs discriminated against
older couriers in violation of the ADEA. In April 2002,
respondent and others filed this ADEA suit claiming, inter
alia, that the programs were veiled attempts to force out,
harass, and discriminate against older couriers. FedEx
moved to dismiss respondent's action, contending she had
not filed the "charge" required by sec. 626(d). Respondent
countered that her Form 283 and affidavit constituted a
valid charge, but the District Court disagreed and granted
FedEx's motion. The Second Circuit reversed.
Held:
1. In addition to the information required by the implementing
regulations, i.e., an allegation of age discrimination
and the name of the charged party, if a filing is to be
deemed a "charge" under the ADEA it must be reasonably
construed as a request for the agency to take remedial
action to protect the employee's rights or otherwise settle
a dispute between the employer and the employee. Pp. 3-13.
(a) There is little dispute that the EEOC's regulations--so
far as they go--are reasonable constructions of the statutory
term "charge" and are therefore entitled to deference under
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U. S. 837 . However, while the regulations give
some content to the term charge, they fall short of a comprehensive
definition. Thus, the issue is the guidance the regulations
give. Title 29 CFR sec. 1626.3 says: "charge shall mean
a statement filed with the [EEOC] which alleges that the
named prospective defendant has engaged in or is about
to engage in acts in violation of the Act." Section 1626.8(a)
identifies information a "charge should contain," including:
the employee's and employer's names, addresses, and phone
numbers; an allegation that the employee was the victim
of age discrimination; the number of employees of the charged
employer; and a statement indicating whether the charging
party has initiated state proceedings. Section 1626.8(b),
however, seems to qualify these requirements by stating
that a charge is "sufficient" if it meets the requirements
of sec. 1626.6--i.e., if it is "in writing and ... name[s]
the prospective respondent and ... generally allege[s]
the discriminatory act(s)." That the meaning of charge
remains unclear, even with the regulations, is evidenced
by the differing positions of the parties and the Courts
of Appeals on the matter. Pp. 3-5.
(b) Just as this Court defers to reasonable statutory interpretations,
an agency is entitled to deference when it adopts a reasonable
interpretation of its regulations, unless its position
is " ' plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,'
" Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 . The Court accords such
deference to the EEOC's position that its regulations identify
certain requirements for a charge but do not provide an
exhaustive definition. It follows that a document meeting
sec.1626.6's requirements is not a charge in every instance.
The language in sec.sec.1626.6 and 1626.8 cannot be viewed
in isolation from the rest of the regulations. While the
regulations' structure is less than clear, the relevant
provisions are grouped under the title, "Procedures--Age
Discrimination in Employment Act." A permissible reading
is that the regulations identify the procedures for filing
a charge but do not state the full contents of a charge.
Pp. 5-6.
(c) That does not resolve this case because the regulations
do not state what additional elements are required in a
charge. The EEOC submits, in accordance with a position
it has adopted in internal directives over the years, that
the proper test is whether a filing, taken as a whole,
should be construed as a request by the employee for the
EEOC to take whatever action is necessary to vindicate
her rights. Pp. 6-8.
(d) The EEOC acted within its authority in formulating
its request-to-act requirement. The agency's policy statements,
embodied in its compliance manual and internal directives,
interpret not only its regulations but also the statute
itself. Assuming these interpretive statements are not
entitled to full Chevron deference, they nevertheless are
entitled to a "measure of respect" under the less deferential
standard of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 , see
Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540
U. S. 461 , whereby the Court considers whether the agency
has consistently applied its position, e.g., United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218 . Here, the relevant interpretive
statement has been binding on EEOC staff for at least five
years. True, the agency's implementation has been uneven;
e.g., its field office did not treat respondent's filing
as a charge, and, as a result, she filed suit before the
EEOC could initiate conciliation with FedEx. Such undoubted
deficiencies are not enough, however, to deprive an agency
that processes over 175,000 inquiries a year of all judicial
deference. Moreover, the charge must be defined in a way
that allows the agency to fulfill its distinct statutory
functions of enforcing antidiscrimination laws, see 29
U. S. C. sec.626(d), and disseminating information about
those laws to the public, see, e.g., Civil Rights Act of
1964, sec.sec.705(i), 705(g)(3). Pp. 8-12.
(e) FedEx's view that because the EEOC must act "[u]pon
receiving ... a charge," 29 U. S. C. sec.626(d), its failure
to do so means the filing is not a charge, is rejected
as too artificial a reading of the ADEA. The statute requires
the aggrieved individual to file a charge before filing
a lawsuit; it does not condition the individual's right
to sue upon the agency taking any action. Cf. Edelman v.
Lynchburg College, 535 U. S. 106 . Moreove
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