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Oral argument previews:
Prepared by the liibulletin editorial board:
< http://www.law.cornell.edu/bulletin/board_current.htm >
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ATTENTION: TEACHERS
If you are using the LIIBULLETIN or the LII web site in the
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SECOND AMENDMENT, RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS,
MILITIA, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, GUN BAN, HANDGUNS
District of Columbia v. Heller (07-290)
Oral argument: Tuesday, March 18, 2008
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit
(November 20, 2007)
The District of Columbia bans possession of handguns, and bans
anyone from carrying a handgun or other deadly or dangerous
weapon without a license within its borders (the "Gun Ban"). It
also requires that any firearms which may be kept within the
District, such as rifles, be kept either disassembled or with a
trigger lock. These are some of the most restrictive gun laws in
the nation. Joseph Heller claims these laws violate his Second
Amendment right to "keep and bear Arms." The Supreme Court has
not taken a Second Amendment case since 1939, and it has never
decided whether the Second Amendment confers a right to bear
arms upon individuals or only upon the militias it refers to in
its opening clause. In the intervening 69 years, the federal and
state governments have passed many laws regulating and
restricting the ownership and use of guns. Should the Supreme
Court uphold the D.C. Circuit's invalidation of the Gun Ban, it
could have a substantial impact on these gun laws and will
almost certainly lead to more litigation as gun rights advocates
challenge those laws as violating the Second Amendment. If the
Court finds that the Gun Ban is constitutional, it will
strengthen the ability of government to regulate gun ownership,
and may result in more restrictive gun laws across the country.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-290.html
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LABOR LAW, PREEMPTION, UNION ORGANIZING, FIRST AMENDMENT,
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown (06-939)
Oral argument: March 19, 2008
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit
(Sep. 21, 2006)
The California state legislature passed an act, AB 1889, which
bars private employers receiving state funds from using the
funds to assist, promote, or deter union organizing. AB 1889
also prohibits private employers who participate in state
programs and who receive state funds from using those funds for
the purpose of promoting or hindering union organization. The
United States Chamber of Commerce claims that this statute is
preempted by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). A
finding for the Chamber of Commerce would protect employer free
speech over attempts by states to define neutrality between
management and labor. Conversely, a finding for California would
provide unions potential safeguards in their struggle against
employers seeking to stave off union organizing while furthering
the overall policy of California of remaining neutral in the
struggle between management and labor.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/06-1204.html
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CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 19, INTERPLEADER, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY,
INDISPENSIBLE PARTIES
Philippines v. Pimentel (06-1204)
Oral argument: March 17, 2008
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit
(Sep. 12, 2006)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) requires a federal court
to dismiss a civil action if an unavailable party is
indispensable, that is, if the court could not in good
conscience proceed without that party. Foreign sovereigns can
make themselves unavailable by asserting their sovereign
immunity from suit. The Supreme Court will consider the
interaction between these two doctrines in this interpleader
action to resolve the ownership of property claimed by the
Republic of the Philippines ("Philippines") and by Mariano
Pimentel ("Pimentel"). The Philippines successfully asserted its
sovereign immunity, and now argues that the action cannot
proceed in its absence. Pimentel responds that foreign
sovereigns cannot stop an interpleader action merely by claiming
an interest in the property at issue and then asserting
sovereign immunity. The Court's decision in this case will
impact courts' ability to adjudicate title to assets claimed by
foreign sovereigns. This issue is likely to become increasingly
important as sovereigns make ever-greater investments in private
sector assets.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/06-1204.html
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BANKRUPTCY, TAX, STAMP TAX, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias (07-312)
Oral argument: March 26, 2008.
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit (April 18, 2007).
Soon after Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11, it sought and received authorization from the
Bankruptcy Court to sell its assets under Section 363(b)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Code. Piccadilly also sought and received an
exemption, pursuant to Section 1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code,
from Florida state tax on this sale. The Florida Department of
Revenue objected to this exemption because the sale took place
before the bankruptcy plan was confirmed. On appeal, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the decision of
the Bankruptcy Court to exempt asset sales prior to confirmation
of a bankruptcy plan. The Florida Department of Revenue argues
that the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the statute is not
justified by the rules of statutory interpretation and claims
that the lower court's decision will create much unnecessary
litigation and ambiguity in the law. Piccadilly Cafeterias
argues, however, that the text is ambiguous and therefore can be
read to support both points of view. For this reason, Piccadilly
suggests looking beyond the text to congressional intent and
policy concerns. Whichever way the Court interprets this
statute, this case will have a profound impact on state and
local revenue collection.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-312.html
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SIXTH AMENDMENT, RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, TX (07-440)
Oral argument: March 17, 2008
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit (June 29, 2007)
On July 15, 2002, Walter Allen Rothgery was arrested without
warrant and appeared before a local magistrate as required by
Texas law. Following his release on bond, Rothgery made several
written requests for appointed counsel to Gillespie County
officials, but county officials failed to appoint defense
counsel until after a grand jury indicted Rothgery six months
later. Rothgery sued Gillespie County under 42 U.S.C. 1983,
claiming that the County's failure to grant his request until
after indictmen
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