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WASHINGTON STATE GRANGE v. WASHINGTON STATE REPUBLICAN PARTY (Nos.
06-713 and 06-730)
Web-accessible at:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-713.ZS.html
Argued: October 1, 2007 -- Decided: March 18, 2008
Opinion author: Thomas
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After the Ninth Circuit invalidated Washington's blanket
primary system on the ground that it was nearly identical
to the California system struck down in California Democratic
Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567 , state voters passed an
initiative (I-872), providing that candidates must be identified
on the primary ballot by their self-designated party preference;
that voters may vote for any candidate; and that the two
top votegetters for each office, regardless of party preference,
advance to the general election. Respondent political parties
claim that the new law, on its face, violates a party's
associational rights by usurping its right to nominate
its own candidates and by forcing it to associate with
candidates it does not endorse. The District Court granted
respondents summary judgment, enjoining I-872's implementation.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Held: I-872 is facially constitutional. Pp. 6-16.
(a) Facial challenges, which require a showing that a law
is unconstitutional in all of its applications, are disfavored:
They often rest on speculation; they run contrary to the
fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts
should neither " 'anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it' " nor "
'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied,'
" Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288 ; and they threaten to
shortcircuit the democratic process by preventing laws
embodying the will of the people from being implemented
consistent with the Constitution. Pp. 6-8.
(b) If I-872 severely burdens associational rights, it
is subject to strict scrutiny and will be upheld only if
it is "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,"
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U. S. 581 . Contrary to petitioners'
argument, this Court's presumption in Jones--that a nonpartisan
blanket primary where the top two votegetters proceed to
the general election regardless of party would be a less
restrictive alternative to California's system because
it would not nominate candidates--is not dispositive here.
There, the Court had no occasion to determine whether a
primary system that indicates each candidate's party preference
on the ballot, in effect, chooses the parties' nominees.
Respondents' arguments that I-872 imposes a severe burden
are flawed. They claim that the law is unconstitutional
under Jones because it allows primary voters unaffiliated
with a party to choose the party's nominee, thus violating
the party's right to choose its own standard bearer. Unlike
California's primary, however, the I-872 primary does not,
by its terms, choose the parties' nominees. The choice
of a party representative does not occur under I-872. The
two top primary candidates proceed to the general election
regardless of their party preferences. Whether the parties
nominate their own candidate outside the state-run primary
is irrelevant. Respondents counter that voters will assume
that candidates on the general election ballot are their
preferred nominees; and that even if voters do not make
that assumption, they will at least assume that the parties
associate with, and approve of, the nominees. However,
those claims depend not on any facial requirement of I-872,
but on the possibility that voters will be confused as
to the meaning of the party-preference designation. This
is sheer speculation. Even if voters could possibly misinterpret
the designations, I-872 cannot be struck down in a facial
challenge based on the mere possibility of voter confusion.
The State could implement I-872 in a variety of ways, e.g.,
through ballot design, that would eliminate any real threat
of confusion. And without the specter of widespread voter
confusion, respondents' forced association and compelled
speech arguments fall flat. Pp. 8-15.
(c) Because I-872 does not severely burden respondents,
the State need not assert a compelling interest. Its interest
in providing voters with relevant information about the
candidates on the ballot is easily sufficient to sustain
the provision. P. 15.
460 F. 3d 1108, reversed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Alito, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a concurring
opinion, in which Alito, J., joined. Scalia, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined.
Notes:
* Together with No. 06-730, Washington et al. v. Washington
State Republican Party et al., also on certiorari to the
same court.
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