|
============================================================
Oral argument previews:
Prepared by the liibulletin editorial board:
< http://www.law.cornell.edu/bulletin/board_current.htm >
=============================================================
NATIVE AMERICANS, INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS, JURISDICTION, MONTANA
DOCTRINE, CONSENSUAL AGREEMENTS WITH TRIBAL PARTIES, PRESERVATION
OF TRIBAL WELFARE
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle (07-411)
Oral argument: April 14, 2008
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit
(June 26, 2007)
In 1999, the Plains Commerce Bank filed an eviction notice in
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court against the Long Family Land
and Cattle Company. The bank had no tribal affiliation, but the
company belonged to members of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and
operated on reservation land. The land in question had once
belonged to the company's owners, but it came under the bank's
ownership when the company defaulted on its loans. For two years,
the company leased its land from the bank. When the lease
expired, the bank attempted to evict the company, which responded
by alleging a pattern of predatory lending by the bank. After a
jury trial, the tribal court awarded the company $750,000 in
damages and the option to buy back its land. The bank then filed
a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Dakota, claiming that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to
decide the case. Both the District Court and the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, held that the tribal court did have
jurisdiction. The bank now appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court in a
case that will test the jurisdictional power of tribal courts
over non-tribal parties.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-411.html
=============================================================
SEPARATION OF POWERS, DUE PROCESS, MANDATORY SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, SENTENCE APPEALS
Greenlaw v. United States (07-330)
Oral argument: April 15, 2008
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
(March 23, 2007)
Michael Greenlaw was a member of the "Family Mob" gang which sold
crack cocaine on the south side of Minneapolis. Police arrested
Greenlaw after he and another Family Mob member used dynamite to
destroy a portion of a rival gang member's home. Greenlaw was
charged and convicted by a jury of various drug and conspiracy
crimes and two firearm-related offenses: carrying a firearm in
relation to a drug trafficking crime and carrying a firearm
during a crime of violence. The Government asserted that the
second firearm charge constituted a "second or subsequent
offense" under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and therefore required the
court to impose a consecutive 25 year incarceration sentence to
any other sentence. The trial court rejected the Government's
assertion and sentenced Greenlaw to 442 months in prison, 120 of
which (10 years) were imposed as a result of the second weapons
charge. The Government did not exercise its right to appeal the
sentence, nor did it cross-appeal the sentence when Greenlaw
appealed it to the Eighth Circuit. Despite the absence of an
argument by the Government for an increase, the Eighth Circuit
decided to remand the case to the lower court with an order to
increase Greenlaw's sentence by 15 years. Following denial of a
petition for a rehearing, Greenlaw filed for certiorari with the
Supreme Court challenging the Eighth Circuit's sua sponte
increase in his incarceration sentence. The Supreme Court's
decision in this case will reflect its view of the appropriate
balance between the interest of the courts in consistently
interpreting and applying sentencing statutes, and defendants'
right to appeal without subjecting themselves to a sentence
increase.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-330.html
=============================================================
DEATH PENALTY, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, NON-HOMICIDE
Kennedy v. Louisiana (07-343)
Oral argument: Apr. 16, 2008
Appealed from: Supreme Court of Louisiana (May 22, 2007)
A Louisiana jury found Patrick Kennedy guilty under Louisiana's
aggravated rape statute of aggravated rape of his eight-year-old
stepdaughter. This statute provided a sentence of death for the
rape of a child under twelve years of age. After finding
aggravating circumstances, as required by Louisiana law, the jury
recommended that Kennedy be sentenced to death. After the
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence,
Kennedy petitioned the United States Supreme Court to invalidate
the sentence on either of two grounds: first, that imposing a
death sentence for rape, where the victim does not die,
constitutes disproportionate, and therefore "cruel and unusual
punishment" under the Eighth Amendment; second, that the
aggravating circumstances in the case-that the offender was
perpetrating an aggravated rape and the victim was under twelve
years old-merely repeated elements of the underlying crime and
therefore did not sufficiently limit eligibility for a death
sentence to avoid arbitrary sentencing. Kennedy's first
contention asks the Court to revisit its decision in Coker v.
Georgia, which invalidated, on Eighth Amendment grounds, a death
sentence for the rape of a sixteen-year-old.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-343.html
=============================================================
LAW OF JUDGMENTS, RES JUDICATA, PRIVITY, CLAIM PRECLUSION,
VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Taylor v. Sturgell (07-371)
Oral argument: April 16, 2008
Appealed from: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit (June 22, 2007)
Brent Taylor, executive director of the Antique Aircraft
Association ("AAA") filed a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
request with the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") to
obtain plans and specifications for a vintage aircraft. After the
FAA denied Taylor's request on trade-secret grounds, he sued to
compel disclosure of the information. The D.C. Circuit affirmed
the district court's finding that Taylor's claim was barred
because he had been "virtually represented" in a prior action by
Greg Herrick, a fellow AAA member whose prior FOIA request for
the same records the Tenth Circuit found to have been properly
denied due to trade-secret protections. Taylor asserts that
preclusion of his claim on the "virtual representation" theory
violated his due process rights because he had no legal
relationship with Herrick and received no notice of the prior
suit. The FAA counters that preclusion was appropriate because
Herrick had adequately represented Taylor's interests in the
earlier action. The decision in this case will clarify the
circumstances under which courts may bar claims under the
"virtual representation" theory and may influence plaintiffs'
litigation strategies, broaden defendants' exposure to
duplicative suits, and limit the availability of FOIA requests of
certain members of the public.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-371.html
=============================================================
RICO, MAIL FRAUD, RELIANCE
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. (07-210)
Oral argument: April 14, 2008
Appealed from: United States Co
|
| |
| |
|
