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Oral argument previews:
Prepared by the liibulletin editorial board:
< http://www.law.cornell.edu/bulletin/board_current.htm >
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EQUAL PROTECTION, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, CLASS-OF-ONE
DOCTRINE, RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agriculture (07-474)
Oral argument: April 21, 2008
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit
(February 8, 2007)
Under what is known as the class-of-one theory, an individual
plaintiff can bring an Equal Protection claim against a state
actor for "irrational and wholly arbitrary treatment." The person
is a "class-of-one" when she alleges that the government is
subjecting only her to differing and unique treatment compared to
others similarly situated. This differs from a traditional Equal
Protection claim, in which a person alleges discriminatory acts
by the government against an entire group of people treated
differently because of a protected characteristic like race. Anup
Engquist brought such a class-of-one claim against her employer, the
Oregon Department of Agriculture, alleging that it arbitrarily failed
to promote her to a position for which she was qualified, allowed a
supervisor with whom she had an acrimonious relationship to
harass and degrade her, and eventually laid her off. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in overturning the District Court that
found in her favor on the Equal Protection claim, held that the
class-of-one theory is inapplicable to decisions made by state
employers with regard to their employment decisions. Engquist has
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that there is
no basis in the Equal Protection Clause for a limitation on
class-of-one claims in the employment context. The Oregon
Department of Agriculture and the Ninth Circuit assert that
class-of-one cases are appropriate when the government is acting
as regulator, but not as employer.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-474.html
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ARTICLE III STANDING, PRUDENTIAL STANDING DOCTRINE, ASSIGNMENT,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
Sprint Communications v. APCC Services, Inc. (07-552)
Oral argument: April 21, 2008
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit (2007)
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires long-distance
telephone companies, such as Sprint and AT&T, to fairly
compensate payphone service providers (PSPs) when consumers use
the companies' access codes to complete long-distance calls on
payphones. About 1,400 PSPs assigned their rights "of collection"
to a third-party aggregator, American Public Communications
Council Services (APCC), in order for APCC to sue Sprint and AT&T
for inadequate compensation on the PSPs' behalf. While the
District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed
APCC's suit for lack of standing under Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution, it later vacated its ruling and denied the
motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ultimately found that APCC had standing to sue
as well as the private right to sue in federal court. On appeal,
the Supreme Court will determine whether an assignment of claims
"for purposes of collection" establishes standing for a third-
party assignee. The Court will examine whether APCC meets the
standing requirements of injury-in-fact and redressability. A
decision for APCC could allow future parties to bring collective
suits while bypassing legislative safeguards, such as those
established for class actions. On the other hand, a decision for
Sprint and AT&T may frustrate enforcement of the
Telecommunications Act by preventing efficient collection
efforts.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-552.html
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ELECTIONS, CAMPAIGN FINANCE, FIRST AMENDMENT, EQUAL PROTECTION
Davis v. Federal Election Commission (07-320)
Oral argument: April 22, 2008.
Appealed from: United States District Court for the District
of Columbia (August 9, 2007).
During his 2004 campaign for a seat in the United States House of
Representatives, Jack Davis spent more than $350,000 of his own
money. As a result, Section 319 of the Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act of 2002, the so-called "Millionaire's
Amendment," required him to disclose certain information to the
government and afforded his opponent a raised contribution limit,
allowing his opponent's supporters to contribute more to his
opponent's campaign. Prior to his 2006 campaign, he challenged
Section 319 by filing suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. The court granted summary judgment
to the Federal Election Commission ("FEC"), and Davis appealed
directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, pursuant to BCRA and several
other statutes. Davis argues that by allowing increased
contributions to his opponent and by forcing him to disclose
strategic information, Section 319 violates his First Amendment
right to free speech and his Fifth Amendment right to the equal
protection of the laws. In response, the FEC argues that the
"millionaire's amendment" does not burden political speech and is
justified by Congress' interests in combating corruption and
leveling the playing field. Over the years, Congress and the
judiciary have made significant changes to the campaign finance
system in an attempt to make it more evenhanded and to root out
corruption. The case at hand is another test of Congress's latest
attempt to create sustainable election financing laws.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-320.html
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AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, AGE DISCRIMINATION, OLDER WORKERS,
REDUCTION IN FORCE, LAY-OFFS, BURDEN OF PROOF, BURDEN OF
PERSUASION
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (06-1505)
Oral argument: April 23, 2008
Appealed from: U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit (August
14, 2006).
In this case, a hair's breadth of analytical difference is worth
almost $6 million dollars, as the plaintiffs, former employees at
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory ("KAPL") ask the U.S. Supreme
Court to overturn the Second Circuit's finding for the
defendants. The plaintiffs had prevailed at trial and on appeal
on a disparate impact theory of illegal age discrimination under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the "ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.
621 et seq., when the Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration
in light of Smith v. City of Jackson. While upholding the
disparate impact theory, City of Jackson also requires the
touchstone of the analysis to be whether employers considered
"reasonable factors other than age," which the Second Circuit
determined was a burden of persuasion to be borne by the
plaintiffs. The employee-plaintiffs disagree, maintaining that
the "reasonable factors other than age" harbor in the ADEA
statute is a traditional affirmative defense on which the
employer-defendants bear the burden of proof. In determining
where the burden rests, the Supreme Court's decision will impact
the nature of future employee litigation under th
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