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AN E-BULLETIN
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE -- CORNELL LAW SCHOOL
lii.law.cornell.edu
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The following information has just arrived via the LII's
direct Project HERMES feed from the Supreme Court. A list of
links for today's material is followed by the syllabus for any
case which had one.
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DEATH PENALTY, LETHAL INJECTION, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT,
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
BAZE v. REES (07-5439 Syllabus)
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07-5439.ZS.html
SENTENCING, CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, CONFORMING AMENDMENTS,
FELONY DRUG OFFENSE, ENHANCED MANDATORY MINIMIUM SENTENCE,
AMBIGUITY, CRIMINAL STATUTE, LENITY
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES (6-11429 Syllabus)
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/6-11429.ZS.html
SENTENCING, ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT, FELON, RECIDIVIST, DWI,
FIREARM, DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED, DRUNK DRIVING, GUN
BEGAY v. UNITED STATES (6-11543 Syllabus)
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/6-11543.ZS.html
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BURGESS v. UNITED STATES (No. 06-11429)
Web-accessible at:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/6-11429.ZS.html
Argued: March 24, 2008 -- Decided: April 16, 2008
Opinion author: Ginsburg
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The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) doubles the mandatory
minimum sentence for certain federal drug crimes if the
defendant was previously convicted of a "felony drug offense."
21 U. S. C. sec.841(b)(1)(A). Section 802(13) defines the
unadorned term "felony" to mean any "offense classified
by applicable Federal or State law as a felony," while
sec.802(44) defines the compound term "felony drug offense"
to "mea[n] an offense [involving specified drugs] that
is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under
any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country."
Petitioner Burgess pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of
cocaine base, an offense that ordinarily carries a 10-year
mandatory minimum sentence. Burgess had a prior South Carolina
cocaine possession conviction, which carried a maximum
sentence of two years but was classified as a misdemeanor
under state law. The Federal Government argued that Burgess'
minimum federal sentence should be enhanced to 20 years
under sec.841(b)(1)(A) because his South Carolina conviction
was punishable by more than one year's imprisonment. Burgess
countered that because "felony drug offense" incorporates
the term "felony," a word separately defined in sec.802(13),
a prior drug offense does not warrant an enhanced sec.841(b)(1)(A)
sentence unless it is both (1) classified as a felony under
the law of the punishing jurisdiction, per sec.802(13);
and (2) punishable by more than one year's imprisonment,
per sec.802(44). Rejecting that argument, the District
Court ruled that sec.802(44) alone controls the meaning
of "felony drug offense" under sec.841(b)(1)(A). The Fourth
Circuit affirmed.
Held: Because the term "felony drug offense" in sec.841(b)(1)(A)
is defined exclusively by sec.802(44) and does not incorporate
sec.802(13)'s definition of "felony," a state drug offense
punishable by more than one year qualifies as a "felony
drug offense," even if state law classifies the offense
as a misdemeanor. Pp. 4-11.
(a) The CSA's language and structure indicate that Congress
used "felony drug offense" as a term of art defined by
sec.802(44) without reference to sec.802(13). First, a
definition such as sec.802(44)'s that declares what a term
"means" generally excludes any meaning that is not stated.
E.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 , n. 10. Second,
because "felony" is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year, see, e.g., 18 U.
S. C. sec.3559(a), sec.802(44)'s definition of "felony
drug offense" as "an offense ... punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year" leaves no blank for sec.802(13)
to fill. Third, if Congress wanted "felony drug offense"
to incorporate sec.802(13)'s definition of "felony," it
easily could have written sec.802(44) to state: "The term
'felony drug offense' means a felony that is punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year ... ." Fourth, the
Court's reading avoids anomalies that would arise if both
sec.sec.802(13) and 802(44) governed application of sec.841(b)(1)(A)'s
sentencing enhancement. Section 802(13) includes only federal
and state offenses and would exclude enhancement based
on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion
of foreign offenses in sec.841(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, Burgess'
compound definition of "felony drug offense" leaves unanswered
the appropriate classification of drug convictions in state
and foreign jurisdictions that do not label offenses as
felonies or misdemeanors. Finally, the Court's reading
of sec.802(44) hardly renders sec.802(13) extraneous; the
latter section serves to define "felony" for the many CSA
provisions using that unadorned term. Pp. 4-8.
(b) The CSA's drafting history reinforces the Court's reading.
In 1988, Congress first defined "felony drug offense" as,
inter alia, "an offense that is a felony under ... any
law of a State" (emphasis added), but, in 1994, it amended
the statutory definition to its present form. By recognizing
sec.802(44) as the exclusive definition of "felony drug
offense," the Court's reading serves an evident purpose
of the 1994 revision: to eliminate disparities resulting
from divergent state classifications of offenses by adopting
a uniform federal standard based on the authorized term
of imprisonment. By contrast, Burgess' reading of the 1994
alteration as merely adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement
to a definition already requiring designation of an offense
as a felony by the punishing jurisdiction would attribute
to the amendment little practical effect and encounters
formidable impediments: the statute's text and history.
Pp. 8-10.
(c) Burgess' argument that the rule of lenity should be
applied in determining whether "felony drug offense" incorporates
sec.802(13)'s definition of "felony" is rejected. The touchstone
of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity. E.g., Bifulco
v. United States, 447 U. S. 381 . Because Congress expressly
defined "felony drug offense" in a manner that is coherent,
complete, and by all signs exclusive, there is no ambiguity
for the rule of lenity to resolve here. Pp. 10-11.
478 F. 3d 658, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered an opinion for a unanimous Court.
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