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ttp://www.concordbridge.net/NSPD-51.htm
NSPD-51 and the Potential for a Coup d'=E9tat by National Emergency
By William H. White
January 27, 2008
NOTE TO THE READER: This paper addresses the possibility of a
coup d'=E9tat by national emergency before the end of Bush's last year
in
office, citing recent institutional actions that can be reasonably
interpreted as being consistent with and preparatory to such an
undertaking. These actions, all occurring since Bush's reelection,
include among
others: 1) claiming by executive order emergency powers unauthorized
by
Congress; 2) contracting for the construction of high capacity
detention centers throughout the country; 3) conducting nation-wide
mass
arrest exercises; 4) obtaining from Congress removal of legal
impediments to
the indefinite detention of US citizens without trial; 5) obtaining
from Congress the authority to use federal troops for domestic police
duties, by nullifying the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878; and, 6)
obtaining
from Congress the authority to use national guard units, without the
consent of state's governor, in that or any other state. While these
and
other actions cited here have alternative, plausible explanation, and
those participating in them may be entirely unaware of the darker
ends to
which their work may be put, nevertheless each is troubling and
collectively they demand serious assessment as a potential threat to
both our
constitutional republic and its democratic governance, especially in
light of the Bush administration's record of unlawful behavior. The
reader is therefore asked to give this careful consideration because
the
eternal vigilance necessary to protect our liberty is better served
by
reasonable suspicion than by enduring trust.
Introduction
While a responsible president might deal with a real
emergency using necessary measures within limited areas for an
appropriate
duration, the concern here is with the abuse of such power, by which
a real or contrived emergency is used as pretext to exercise over-broad
powers on a national scale for a duration that adversely affects
constitutional governance, including national elections and due
process.
National Security Presidential Directive 51 (NSPD-51) on May 9,
2007
Can you think of anyone better than George W. Bush with
whom
to entrust the dictatorial powers hinted at in NSPD-51? Or perhaps
you
are unwilling to trust anyone with such powers, even Bush. That is
not
a option in NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 51 (NSPD-51),
signed by Bush and released without comment by the White House on May
9,
2007. To quote from NSPD-51: "This policy establishes 'National
Essential Functions,' prescribes continuity requirements for all
executive
departments and agencies, and provides guidance for State, local,
territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector organizations
in order
to ensure a comprehensive and integrated national continuity program
that will enhance the credibility of our national security posture
and
enable a more rapid and effective response to and recovery from a
national
emergency." What one would expect, but for some of its few details.
Bush: I am The Coordinator
Under NSPD-51, during a national emergency only limited
'National Essential Functions' of government will continue, which may
or
may not include Congress and the courts. NSPD-51 assures us:
"Enduring
Constitutional Government means a cooperative effort among the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal
Government,
coordinated by the President, as a matter of comity with respect to
the
legislative and judicial branches..." This "matter of comity," which
usually
refers to the informal and voluntary recognition of jurisdiction
among
courts, is troublesomely ambiguous in this context. Is Bush claiming
that he, rather than the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the
Supreme
Court, determines which functions the three branches of the federal
government shall perform as well as the checks and balances among
them?
Does the president decide for himself, as he "coordinates", which
laws
and court orders to faithfully execute? If the emergency event does
not
critically disrupt federal government operations, does Bush's NSPD-51
envision still limiting government operations to 'National Essential
Functions'? Is this executive order lawful since it overrides the
National
Emergencies Act, creating a new position of National Continuity
Coordinator without congressional authorization?
The Plan: Now You See It; Now You Don't
NSPD-51 claims that it "provides guidance" to state and
local governments, when in fact it does the opposite because it
revoked
the then existing Presidential Decision Directive 67 of October 21,
1998
("Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Government
Operations"), including "all Annexes thereto." And replaced them with
NSPD-51, along with: "Annex A and the classified Continuity Annexes,
attached
hereto." But then the rabbit disappears as NSPD-51 soldiers on: "This
directive and the information contained herein shall be protected
from
unauthorized disclosure, provided that, except for Annex A, the
Annexes
attached to this directive are classified and shall be accorded
appropriate handling, consistent with applicable Executive Orders."
In other
words, all the details are secret and even the non secret "Annex A"
remains undisclosed by the White House.
Having revoked without explanation the nation's then
existing emergency plan for continued national governance on May 9,
2007,
Bush's NSPD-51 calls for: "The Plan shall be submitted to the
President
for approval not later than 90 days after the date of this
directive."
One assumes, during this lapse in emergency plans, no emergency was
expected, or at least presented less risk than leaving that old
Clinton plan
in place. Since the national media, except one story each in the
Washington Post and Boston Globe, have ignored NSPD-51, Bush has not
bothered to explain any of this.
Especially if such explanations might raise questions
about
what was so unacceptable in the existing plan that it needed to be
revoked before finishing work on the new plan. Does this serve to
rush the
review of one of the most complex and sensitive plans in government
in
an attempt to slip something by the rest of us? Or, more ominously,
does it remove some impediment to contemplated action? Whatever the
motive, abruptly revoking the existing plan, while mandating a new
plan
within 90 days, indicates the same unfortunate mix of high optimism
and
low competence that characterizes much of the Bush administration's
planning record. Clearly Bush is confident he can do far better than
Clinton, whose administration, including all executive departments,
labored
for years on that old plan. Both NSPD-51 and Presidential Decision
Directive 67 contain secret material, so much of the old plan may
even be in
the new plan, who knows?
Congress in the Dark, As Usual
Among those who do not know are members of the House
Committee on Homeland Security. The Bush administration has
r
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